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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
this class of cases from the benefits of the contract, although there has been
no definite statement that this alone will be sufficient to bar liability in all
cases. Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U. S. (1931) 256
N. Y. 208, 176 N. E. 144; Blonski v. Bankers Life Co. (1932) 209 Wis. 5,
243 N. W. 410.
It seems to be a fair inference in almost all of the cases that the clauses
have been incorporated with the purpose in view of entirely eliminating re-
sponsibility for this type of accident. Especially is this true of policies
written, as the present one was, before 1925; that is, before the time when
the aviation industry became a major one and air travel a normal occur-
rence. At that time merely riding in aircraft was regarded as highly dan-
gerous and the companies presumably had no desire to include it among the
risks insured against. See Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
U. S., supra; Reeder, Aircraft Clauses in Accident Policies (1931) 2 Mo. Bar.
Journ. (no. 8) 7. And although the Courts have argued that the insured
might often be unaware of this intention, where "as passenger or otherwise"
is added the words would seem to give him notice.
But the basic difficulty in this and other cases where it is used is the word
"engaged." The insurors advance the contention that it is to be understood
in the same way as engaging in automobiling, tobogganing or some other
form of sport or entertainment, and so used a single act is included; while
beneficiaries argue that its meaning is similar to engaged in railroading or
the drama-some type of business or occupation implying sustained or mul-
tiple activity. The word clearly has two different meanings dependent upon
the concept with which it is associated. That aviation is a business at the
present time and more than a single trip would be necessary to render a per-
son "engaged" in it is incontestable; but that it was so before 1925 is open to
doubt. And if not the decision in the instant case has a sounder basis. In
any event, the highly technical nature of the reasoning is apparent in all the
cases, and in the absence of legislation it would seem that a uniform and
more definite clause in the insurance policies would eliminate the necessity
of much tortuous construction. T. S. M. '36.
NEGLIGENCE--LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURER TO THIRD PERSON FOR DAMAGE
TO PRoPRYr.--The defendant, a manufacturer of paints and varnishes, sold
a secret preparation to a contracting company whose employee used it in
waterproofing the interior of a tank belonging to a third person. The prep-
aration, containing benzine and kerosene, exploded, destroying the tank and
the barn in which it was placed. The insurers, subrogated to the rights of
the owner, seek to recover from the defendant on grounds of negligence.
The jury found negligence on the part of the defendant in failing to warn
against the use of the preparation near fire. Held: The defendant, manu-
facturing a product imminently dangerous to life and property, is liable for
damage caused to property by its negligence. Genesee County Patrons Fire
Relief Assn. v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., et al.; Cooperative Fire Ins. Co. of
Wyoming and Genesee Counties v. Same (N. Y. App. 1934) 189 N. E. 551.
Ever since the case of Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 10 M. & W. 109 it
has been the recognized general rule that a manufacturer is not liable to
third persons who have no contractural relations with him for negligence in
the manufacture or sale of the article. Huset v. J. L Case Threshing Ma-
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chine Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1903) 120 F. 865, 1. c. 868. But exceptions were early
developed and in 1852 the New York Court of Appeals permitted recovery
where the article manufactured was inherently and imminently dangerous
to human life. Thomas v. Winchester (1852) 6 N. Y. (2 Seld.) 397. This
exception is well recognized notes (1922) 17 A. L. R. 672; (1925) 39 A. L. R.
992; (1929) 63 A. L. R. 340. In 1916 the exception was extended in New
York to attach liability to the manufacturer of an article which, when negli-
gently made, would probably place persons in peril. MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co. (1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050. This doctrine has found
wide acceptance. U. S. Radiator Corp. v. Henderson (C. C. A. 10, 1933) 68
F. (2d) 87, 1. c. 91.
The Buick case, however, left undecided the question whether the rule
would apply to cases in which only property was damaged. The New York
Court of Appeals, until the case under discussion, was not faced with that
issue or expressly reserved it. Pine Grove Poultry Farm Inc. v. Newton
By-Products Mfg. Co. (1928) 248 N. Y. 293, 162 N. E. 84.
Cases in point are difficult to reconcile. In Massachusetts the Courts have
been rather consistent in denying recovery where the issue has beeen raised.
Although in an earlier case, Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co. (1870)
104 Mass. 64, recovery was allowed, later cases show the opposite trend. In
Thompkins v. Quaker Oats Co. (1921) 239 Mass. 147,131 N. E. 456, the Court
while regarding food for human consumption as inherently dangerous, re-
fused so to regard poultry food and recovery for loss of chickens was denied.
In Windram Mfg. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co. (1921) 239 Mass. 123, 131 N. E.
454 the plaintiff, engaged in pasting linings to fabrics, bought the defend-
ant's cement from a dealer, and in using it with ordinary care damaged the
fabrics. The defendants demurred to the plaintiff's petition which alleged
negligence in the manufacture of the cement and also defendant's knowledge
that the cement was to be used by the plaintiff. The demurrer was sus-
tained, the Court saying, "No authority has been called to our attention
which imposes a common law duty of care towards strangers to the con-
tract upon the maker of an article which is not inherently dangerous, but is
likely to cause a loss to property because of faulty preparation. These rul-
ings of the Massachusetts Court are in line with their general attitude on the
liability of vendors to third persons. Giberti v. James Barrett Mfg. Co.
(1929) 263 Mass. 81, 165 N. E. 19; Christensen v. Bremer et al.; Same v.
New England Road Machinery Co. (1928) 263 Mass. 129, 160 N. E. 410. It
is true, of course, that both of these cases inferentially indicate that if the
property damage had been caused by an article inherently and imminently
dangerous to both life and property recovery might have been allowed.
Some Courts have been expressly faced with the issue and have permitted
recovery. The New York Supreme Court, in Quackenbush v. Ford
Motor Co. (1915) 167 App. Div. 433, 153 N. Y. S. 131 refused to limit the
liability of a manufacturer of an automobile merely to personal injuries but
definitely extended liability to include property damages. The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court in Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1932)
207 Wis. 209, 240 N. W. 392 said, "We think, however,' that at least where
the article if negligently manufactured will be imminently dangerous to
human safety, the liability should extend to property damage in all cases
where a causal connection can be established between the defect which con-
stitute the article a menace and the property damage." Other cases follow
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this ruling which seems to be the prevailing one. Stowell v. Standard Oil
Co. (1905) 139 Mich. 18, 102 N. W. 227; Skinn v. Reutter (1903) 135 Mich.
57, 97 N. W. 152; Mazetti v. Armour & Co. (1913) 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac.
633; U. S. Radiator Co. v. Henderson et al., supra.
One Court, however, allowed recovery where the article was not danger-
ous to human life but was dangerous only to property. Ellis et al. v. Lind-
mark et al. (1929) 177 Minn. 390, 225 N. W. 395. There the defendant was
negligent in selling linseed oil as cod liver oil to be used for poultry food.
And see Murphy v. Sioux Falls Serum Co. (1921) 44 S. D. 421, 184 N. W. 252;
(1923) 47 S. D. 44, 195 N. W. 835. The instant case, however, confines its
ruling "to cases in which the use of the product is imminently dangerous to
life and property." A. J. G. '36.
WORKIMEN'S COMPENSTION-INJURIES IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-PER-
soNAL AcnvITmS.-Employee, a traveling salesman whose expenses were
borne by his employer, contracted typhoid fever while eating in a restaurant.
This .proceeding was under the Workmen's Compensation Law. Held, that
the injury did not "arise out of and in the course of employment." Compen-
sation deuied. Johnson v. Smith (1933) 263 N. Y. 10, 188 N. E. 140.
This was a four to three decision, the majority holding this an exclusively
personal activity and refusing to draw any distinction between these circum-
stances and those where the employee took a definite lunch period away from
the place of employment and bought his own meal, in which case any injury
clearly would not be compensable. Clark v. Voorhees (1921) 231 N. Y. 14,
131 N. E. 553. The dissenting opinion on the other hand, reasoned that
"the employment was continuous from the time he left his employer's place
of business, and his eating lunch was a necessary incident to his employment."
While unanimous in denying recovery for injuries sustained in the em-
ployee's personal pursuits, a clear conflict obtains as to whether eating and
sleeping belong in this category. In Wynn v. Southern Surety Co. (Texas
Civ. App. 1930) 26 S. W. (2d) 691, a traveling salesman, with expenses paid,
was killed on his way to his hotel, having finished his evening meal. Com-
pensation was denied on the ground that "a traveling salesman while eat-
ing his meal or sleeping at hotels, or attending church or theaters, or go-
ing on picnics or private errands for his own pleasure or profit, is not, within
the contemplation of the Workmen's Compensation Act . . . an injury re-
ceived in the course of his employment." But in the case of Walker V.
Speeder Corp. (1932) 213 Iowa 1134, 240 N. W. 725, a traveling salesman
with all expenses paid who was injured while on the way to get a meal fur-
nished by the employer, received compensation on the ground that this was
a necessary incident to his work. Recovery was also granted for poisoning
by food, where the employee on a particular day was told th lunch at em-
ployer's expense, near the office so as to be more available for an expected
emergency call. Krause v. Swartwood (1928) 174 Minn. 147, 218 N. W. 555.
A strike breaking employee, housed by the employer near the plant and
subject to call 24 hours a day, was injured while returning from his evening
meal at a nearby restaurant. Crippen v. Press Co., Inc. (1930) 228 App.
Div. 727, 239 N. Y. S. 102. And in Hobson v. Dept. of Labor and Industries
of Wash. (Wash. 1934) 27 Pac. (2d) 1091, a nightwatchman on duty 24
hours a day was injured while returning from the place where he got his
food and mail. Recovery was allowed in both instances.
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